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North Carolina

DataNet

Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life School of Journalism and Mass Communication University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Mail vs. Telephone Polls Philip Meyer, Knight Chair in Journalism, UNC-CH

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Thad Beyle, editor & associate director (beyle@email.unc.edu)

Ryan Thornburg, Managing editor & assistant director (thornburg@unc.edu)

Ferrel Guillory, director (quillory@unc.edu)

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Political surveys in North Carolina just got easier.

For the first time, the State Board of Elections has compiled a computer database listing the registered voters in all 100 counties. The School of Journalism and Mass Communication at UNC-CH gave it a field test with a mail survey in the weeks preceding the November 2000 election. It worked.

Launched on October 17, the survey produced a better prediction than the School's telephone poll on the bond referendum for higher education. But it was less accurate on the races for president and governor.

The sample was cleaner than some commercial samples. Bob Rauf, director of information services for the State Board, produced the sample, chosen on an every-nth-name basis, of 5,982 names and addresses of active voters.

An active voter was defined as one who had some contact with a county election board since 1996 – either by voting in the 1996 presidential election, voting in a more recent election, reporting an address change, or registering for the first time.

Only 1,061 of the questionnaires – 18 percent — were returned as undeliverable. In contrast, a sample of names and addresses in Wake County, purchased in the same year from a well-known sampling service, yielded a majority of bad addresses and was judged unusable.

The pre-election mail survey used two mailings: the original letter and questionnaire and a postcard reminder. The response rate was

33 percent, which is comparable to the cooperation rates in current telephone surveys.

An advantage of mail surveys, one that will be shared with Internet polls, is that questions with exhibits can be used. The mail survey presented the language of the bond referendum as it would appear on the ballot. The phone survey could ask only a very general question.

In the telephone poll, 83 percent said they would vote for the referendum, compared to 75 percent in the mail poll. Actual approval of the bonds was by 73 percent.

However, the phone poll was closer on the candidates. It put Bush at 57 percent of the majorparty vote compared to the mail survey's 59 percent. Bush's actual vote was 56.5 percent.

For governor, the mail survey gave Easley 51 percent and the telephone poll 53.5 percent. His final number was 52.9 percent.

Both differences could be explained by a late shift in favor of the Democrats. Mail surveys postmarked by October 21 or before had a slightly greater Republican margin than those sent later.

At a time when telephone surveys have to compete with junk calls from telemarketers and fundraisers, mail surveys offer an attractive alternative while we wait for Internet penetration to increase. The election board's Bob Rauf intends to provide samples at no charge to political parties and educational institutions. Commercial researchers will be asked to pay a fee.

His office is at 506 North Harrington St. in Raleigh. The phone number is (919) 733-7173, and the email address is bob.rauf@ncmail.net.

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Exit Polls vs. the Actual Vote in the 1990s by Thad Beyle, Pearsall Chair in Political Science, UNC-CH

The 2000 presidential election and how the VNS Election Day Exit Poll results were used or misused by the media in predicting the results has been a point of contention over the past three months. Arguments have ranged from "the results of these exit polls were flawed and misled us in the media" to "the media has cut back so far on the election night coverage that they don't have enough real analysts to verify what these polls suggest." Who's correct will probably never be settled exactly and the argument over who's right or wrong will continue.

How well have exit polls predicted elections in North Carolina? There were nine races with 20 candidates between 1992 and 2000 that VNS Election Day exit polls tried to predict. These included three presidential races, three U.S. senatorial races and three gubernatorial races. How successful were the exit polls in predicting their outcomes?

Predicting candidate's actual vote percentage

In terms of the actual vote percent achieved by each of the 20 candidates, the exit poll results were pretty well on target and certainly within their stated +/-4-point margin of error. Here is the record of how close the Exit Poll projections were:

- Right on the button in four cases Faircloth and Hunt in 1992, Perot in 1996, Faircloth in 1998;
- Off by one percentage point in four cases Bush and Gardner in 1992, Edwards in 1998, Gore in 2000;
- Off by two percentage points in five cases Perot in 1992, Gantt and Helms in 1996, Bush and Vinroot in 2000;
- Off by three percentage points in two cases Clinton in 1992; Easley in 2000.
- Off by four percentage points in five cases Sanford in 1992, and Clinton, Dole, Hayes, Hunt in 1996.

Predicting the win/loss vote point spread

The question of most importance in a political contest is who wins. Thus the point spread between the projected winners and losers as measured by the exit polls is of great interest, especially to candidates and to the media for reporting purposes on Election night prior to the compilation of the actual vote. Here is the record of how close the Exit Poll point-spread projections were:

- None were right on the button.
- One missed by one point 1998 U.S. senatorial race;
- One missed by two points 1992 gubernatorial race;
- One missed by three points 2000 presidential race;
- Three missed by four points 1992 presidential and U.S. senatorial races, and 1996 U.S. senatorial race;
- One missed by five points 2000 gubernatorial race;
- Two missed by eight points 1996 presidential and gubernatorial races.

In two presidential races, Exit Poll results showed Clinton with

Exit	Polls vs	s. the Actual V	ote in	the 199	90s
Year	Off.	Cand., Pty	EP	Vote	Dif.
2000	Pres.	Gore, D	45	44	-1
		Bush, R	54	56	+2
	Gov.	Easley, D	55	52	-3
		Vinroot, R	44	46	+2
		Other	1	2	+1
1998	US Sen.	Edwards, D	52	51	- 1
		Faircloth, R	47	47	0
1996	Pres.	Clinton, D	48	44	- 4
		Dole, R	45	49	+4
		Perot, I	7	7	0
	US Sen.	Gantt, D	48	46	-2
		Helms, R	51	53	+2
	Gov.	Hunt, D	60	56	-4
		Hayes, R	39	43	+4
1992	Pres.	Clinton, D	46	43	-3
		Bush, R	42	43	+1
		Perot, I	12	14	+2
	US Sen.	Sanford, D	50	46	-4
		Faircloth, R	50	50	0
	Gov.	Hunt, D	53	53	0
		Gardner, R	44	43	-1

Key: Off. – Office involved; Cand., Pty – candidate and party affiliation; EP – Exit Poll estimate of vote; Vote – actual vote received; Dif. – difference between EP and Vote.

a narrow 4-point [1992] or 3-point [1996] lead. Yet Clinton lost the state in 1992 by a fraction of a percent and lost again in 1996 by a 5-point spread. In the 1992 U.S. senatorial race, exit poll results showed a 50/50% tie between Sanford and Faircloth. But, the actual vote for Sanford was four points below the exit poll projection while the projected vote for Faircloth was right on the button and he won.

At first blush, it might appear that in six of the nine races the Exit Poll projections were within the margin of error, while three missed because they fell outside the +/-4% margin of error. However, with a +/-4% margin of error in predicting a candidate's actual vote, the worst possible situation could be the exit polls being off on each of the two candidates by 4-points in opposite directions – for an 8-point spread! This is not necessarily a disaster. In the 1996 gubernatorial race, Hunt's 21-point spread in the exit polls turned into "only" a 13-point win.

But this worst case possibility is why those interpreting and presenting the exit poll results should be sure to read the fine print at the top of the exit poll report about the margin of error involved in these polls. This suggests that those exit poll results indicating a 5- to 8-point margin are potentially "too close to call," just as those with margins with less than a 4-point spread are.

Automatic Computer Polling by Evan Sauda, Senior journalism major, UNC-CH

There is a new kid on the block in public opinion polling. Cheaper, faster, and with a recent record just as reliable as conventional polls, the automated computer poll is giving the more traditional phone surveys a run for their money.

The traditional poll in the state, the Mason-Dixon poll, was conducted for WRAL television and is named after the company that does the poll, Washington, D.C.-based Mason-Dixon Polling and Research, Inc. The company does polls for news organizations in all of the states using conventional telephone interviewing methods.

SurveyUSA, a Verona, N.J.-based polling firm, conducted the automated WTVD FlashPoll for the television station. The firm specializes in automated telephone surveys, answered by touch-tone key presses rather than recorded by a person. A company called Hypotenuse, Inc., also based out of Verona, N.J, owns SurveyUSA. SurveyUSA produces polls under the names SurveyUSA, FlashPoll and BulletPoll.

But this computerized method of polling elicits some raised eyebrows, head-shaking and even scathing criticism from polling experts. Their consensus seems to be that automated computer polling, despite what its advocates say, is not a valid way to poll. The WTVD FlashPoll did several strange things over the course of the campaign. This casts some doubt on its validity and consistency, and may betray its underlying unreliability.

Both polls did well in predicting the eventual winner. This is not a particularly sensitive test of a poll's accuracy, however. Consistency of results seems to be a far better test. The Mason-Dixon Poll did not show much fluctuation. The poll's predicted strength for Easley remained constant throughout the five-month polling period. Vinroot's support increased by four points over the course of the race, however, as the number of undecided voters shrank by nearly half. It would appear from looking at this poll that most of these six percentage points of undecided voters went for Vinroot.

In the FlashPoll taken on July 10-11, Democratic candidate Mike Easley was ahead by nine percentage points, 50 to 41. The next FlashPoll, taken three and a half weeks later on August 5-6, showed Republican Richard Vinroot ahead, 48 percent to 43 percent. A third FlashPoll taken on August 19-20 showed Easley back in the lead by a comfortable 15 percentage point margin, 53 percent to 38 percent.

This swing could simply be the boost most Republicans receive from the national convention held every presidential election year. The large jump might be because the middle FlashPoll was taken very close to the end of the convention, which ran from July 31 to August 3. Surveying for the questionable poll began on August 5, a scant two days after the

end of the convention. This could very well account for the gap.

Rick Willis, the executive producer of WTVD, attributed the flip-flop to the post convention bounce, and nothing more. He said the station timed the FlashPolls to reflect the usual boost that candidates always get after an event like that. The station did, in fact, poll after the Democratic convention in the same way. This is probably why Easley made such a big gain after being down to Vinroot. The August 19-20 FlashPoll was taken right after the Democratic convention, and showed Easley with a 15 percentage point lead. This lead had shrunk to 7 percentage points two and a half weeks later, perhaps as Easley's bounce wore off.

A likely culprit could be underrepresentation of a particular region or group. A poll with more respondents in a rural, particularly Republican part of the state could cause this. Only 500 people answer the poll each time it is taken, so even 50 people polled from an area like this could cause a large change.

Others are not so kind to the poll and its results. Fluctuations like this, missing in the Mason-Dixon poll, are what is wrong with the FlashPoll, according to Walter DeVries, the executive director of the North Carolina Institute of Political Leadership. "If you're only results-oriented, maybe it works," he said. The wild fluctuations of the poll are a result of its imprecise sample, he said. The computer simply calls people until it gets 500 respondents, which leads to some of the variations. There is nothing like that in the other polls, he said. "What it does is challenge the idea of polling by phone."

But if the poll is methodologically flawed, then why does it continue to pick the winners?

Chance, it seems, is the only answer. The two opposing sides each want to argue about the validity of the poll in a different way. The proponents say that since the results are good, then the underlying mechanics of the poll must be good. The opponents of the poll say that since the mechanics of the poll are flawed, then it is only a matter of time until the poll makes a huge error in predicting an election. The truth is somewhere in the middle.

The automated telephone poll is only invalid if there is a correlation between people who are willing to talk to a machine – as opposed to a person - and some relevant political variable. For example, if people who tend to vote for Democrats are less willing to talk to a machine, then the poll will overestimate the strength of the Republican candidate. If people who tend to vote Republican are less willing to talk to a machine, then the opposite would be true. This correlation has yet to be proven, however

In light of this, it would be prudent to treat FlashPoll results – and other automated poll results as well – with a grain of salt

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Job Approval Ratings and Incumbent Re-elections by Thad Beyle, Pearsall Chair in Political Science, UNC-CH

One proposition that political consultants often suggest is that when an elective official's positive job approval ratings are below 50%, that incumbent may be in political trouble in a reelection bid. With the number of public opinion polls being conducted in the states consistently increasing it is possible to test this proposition to see if and when it holds true.

The 11 incumbents seeking reelection over the last two decades in North Carolina for whom there are such job approval ratings are listed in the accompanying table. There were three presidents [Reagan, 1984; Bush, 1992; Clinton, 1996], five US senators [Helms, 1984, 1990, 1996; Sanford, 1992; Faircloth, 1998], and three governors [Hunt 1980, 1996; Martin, 1988]. Unfortunately, there aren't such North Carolina poll results for President Carter and Senator Morgan [1980], or for incumbents prior to 1980.

These eleven incumbents' positive job approval ratings ranged from a high of 73% for Governor Jim Hunt toward the end of his first term to a low of 36% for President Bill Clinton at the end of his first term. Five of them had ratings above the 50% mark and each won re-election to office.

Six of them had ratings below the 50% mark, and they went 3-for-6 in their re-election bids. Those incumbents for whom the consultant's proposition was true were Senators Lauch Faircloth [47% rating – lost in 1998] and Terry Sanford [43% rating – lost in 1992], and President Bill Clinton [36% rating – lost N.C. in 1996]. Those who overcame the consultant's proposition were Senator Jesse Helms [45% rating – won in 1984 and 1990] and President George Bush [44% rating – won N.C. in 1992].

Also of interest in this table is that the 50% mark relates to another pattern. All the incumbents but Senator Helms [1996] with job ratings above 50% saw their actual vote percent come in lower than their job performance ratings. While two of the incumbents with job performance ratings below the 50% mark achieved identical actual vote %'s [Faircloth, 1998; Bush, 1992], the other four incumbents below the 50% mark achieved a higher actual vote % on Election Day. So, job approval ratings do not equal voting day ratings.

Why? There are at least two separate reasons. First, the polls are "snapshots in time" of how those surveyed rated an incumbent's performance. They probably had not been even thinking about what this question asked of them. On Election Day, voters are much more likely to have had this question on their minds. Second, the samples involved are quite different. In the 27 statewide polls involved here, 7 were samples of adults, 4 were samples of registered voters, and 16 were samples of likely voters. The results on Election Day were 100% samples of actual voters.

We couldn't test this proposition in the 2000 N.C. elections. The president and governor were term limited, and there was no US senatorial election. But this does give us a baseline for future such elections such as in 2002 and 2004.

Job Approval Ratings and Incumbent Re-elections in NC, 1980-1998

Year	Incumbent, Party	Race	Job Approval %			Diff. Between Ratings/Vote
1980	Hunt, D	G	73	62	W	-11
1984	Reagan, R	P	63	61	W	- 2
1996	Hunt, D	G	63	56	W	- 7
1988	Martin, R	G	61	56	W	- 5
1996	Helms, R	S	51	53	W	+ 2
1998	Faircloth, R	S	47	47	L	None
1990	Helms, R	S	45	53	W	+ 8
1984	Helms, R	S	45	52	W	+ 7
1992	Bush, R	P	44	44	W	None
1992	Sanford, D	S	43	46	L	+ 3
1996	Clinton, D	P	36	44	L	+ 8

Key: Race - P = presidential race; S = U.S. senatorial race; G = gubernatorial race Pos. Job Approval Ratings, election year — Average of positive job approval ratings in statewide public opinion polls during the election year, or of the most recent polls prior to the election year if no election year polls are available. Positive = excellent/good; approve, etc. Actual Vote – The incumbent's actual vote percent in that year's election; W/L pts — The incumbent won/lost that election in the state.

Footnotes: Type of sample: ads — adults; lvs — likely voters; rvs — registered voters. Rating Scale: app = approve; exg = excellent, good; expg = excellent, pretty good; g = good.

Sources: Election data from The Almanac of American Politics [various years]. Polling data from this website: www.unc.edu/~beyle.

Campaigns Are Different, Media Are Plural by Ferrel Guillory, Director, SPMP, UNC-CH

Cable news talk shows, journalism reviews and other national magazines regularly critique press and broadcast coverage of campaigns. But they almost invariably focus on national campaigns and the big media of TV networks and major daily newspapers.

And yet, as the 2000 governor's race in North Carolina demonstrated anew, significant differences exist in how national and state campaigns are conducted – and covered. Within the state, anyone attempting to analyze the relationship between media and politics must take into account important variances among newspapers, television and radio. The accompanying chart seeks to provide an outline of key differences.

In 2000, as in 1996, North Carolina served as a site for new initiatives in the media's treatment of campaigns. Here is a look back at the media-politics landscape:

Television

Capitol Broadcasting Co. in Raleigh took the lead in adopting the so-called 5/30 standard for campaign coverage – that is, devoting five minutes a night of candidate-centered discourse for 30 days prior to the election.

Jim Goodmon, chief executive of Capitol, agreed to provide the time on his company's flagship WRAL-TV as well as its smaller stations in Raleigh, Wilmington and Charlotte.

The 5/30 standard was advocated nationwide by the Alliance for Better Campaigns, a Washington-based organization funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts. The UNC Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life served as the "state partner" in North Carolina and focused its efforts on seeking to persuade TV stations to meet the standard, teaching journalists how to improve campaign reporting and monitoring their coverage.

Before the May primaries, Capitol Broadcasting produced three "messages" of one minute, forty-five seconds each from the three Republican and two Democratic candidates for governor. It broadcast these messages daily on WRAL at the end of the noon, 6 p.m. and 11 p.m. news programs. Under the ground rules established by the broadcasting company, attacks on opponents were prohibited. Candidates were asked to address issues identified by the broadcaster as well as an issue of their own choice.

In the general election, Capitol Broadcasting revised and extended its candidates' messages project. In addition to including candidates for governor, the company also offered messages from candidates for lieutenant governor and attorney general.

For several days in October, Capitol's stations ran opposing

Key Differences Between State and National Campaigns and Coverage					
National	State				
Campaigns					
Candidates on the trail	No campaign trail				
Institutionalized debates	Discretionary debates				
TV ads targeted to states	TV ads dominate				
Newspapers					
Pack journalism	No pack				
In-depth polls	Shallow polls				
Day-by-day journalism	Civic journalism				
Broadcasting					
Shift from air to cable	'Wasteland' revisited				
Experienced reporters	Few political reporters				
Too many talking heads	Not enough talking heads				
Late-night comedy	No laughs				
Talk radio	Talk radio, and audience- specific commercials				

candidates' messages back-to-back. This proved more powerful than the one-candidate-at-a-time offering in the spring. In the fall, viewers could see and hear the candidates for governor, lieutenant governor and attorney general speaking, at more length than a sound-bite, one right after the other.

WBTV, the station in Charlotte owned by Jefferson-Pilot, did not give candidates a block of time for "messages." Rather, WBTV produced a daily news report on campaign developments for its 6:30 p.m. newscast, with a reporter and producer assigned to the project, which focused not only on the governor's race but also on congressional primaries in Charlotte-area districts.

Unlike most local TV stations in this state, WBTV has an experienced political reporter, Mike Cozza, who provided much of the coverage. It also has an investigative team that looked at campaign contributions.

Our spot-check monitoring of WBTV throughout the campaign season showed that the station produced some of the strongest

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Ambition Ladders for Governor and U.S. Senators by Thad Beyle, Pearsall Chair in Political Science, UNC-CH

Since 1900, the state has had 23 individuals serve as governor and 21 serve as a U.S. senator. This article explores the some of the patterns of how these individuals reached their position from the perspective of the last rung on the political ladder they used to reach the office.

How They Got There

One theory about how individuals achieve these two elective positions is that there is a "state office route" to the governorship while there is a separate "federal office route" to a U.S. senate seat. [See Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966]. The tables accompanying this article appear to uphold the first part of the theory regarding the governorship, but not the second part regarding the U.S. senate seats in North Carolina.

Governors: Seventeen of the 23 governors [74%] reached that goal by using the "state office route." Nine used a position in the state legislature as their launching pad [39%] while eight others used a separately elected state-wide office as their launching pad [35%]. Only three of the 23 used "the federal office" route of moving from a U.S. Senatorial or Congressional seat to the office, while three other governors had no previous electoral experience. All but one of these governors came to the governorship by election. Luther Hodges [D, 1954] was the lone "accidental governor" who moved into the seat upon the death of incumbent William Umstead-D.

<u>U.S. Senators</u>: Only three of the 21 U.S. senators [14%] reached that goal by using the "federal office route." The most prevalent route for them was the "state office route" of the governorship, another statewide elective office, or a seat in the state legislature [48%]. Note however, that seven of the state's 20th century U.S. senators [33%] had held no other elective position prior to gaining that seat by appointment or election. This includes three of the four senators who have most recently held the seat currently held by John Edwards-D [John Porter East-R, 1981-86; Lauch Faircloth-R, 1993-1999; and Edwards, 1999--]. One-third of the state's U.S. senators were appointed to their positions by the governor upon the death or resignation of the incumbent senator.

How Long They Stayed There

The hypothesis on how long an individual would stay in office would seem to favor U.S. senators who have no term limits on how many 6-year terms they can serve. Governors, on the other hand, could only serve one 4-year term prior to the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment in 1977 allowing the possibility of serving a second, consecutive 4-year term. Despite the fact that an almost equal number of individuals have served in the two U.S. senate seats [21] as in the governor's chair [22] over the 20th century, this hypothesis does hold mainly as there

are two U.S. senate seats to only one governor's chair.

Governors: The average length of service for governors over the 20th Century was 4.5 years. Jim Hunt-D [1977-85, 1993-2001], has been the longest serving governor at 16 years, followed by Jim Martin-R [1985-93] at 8 years and Hodges [1954-61] at 6 years, 2 months. The shortest serving governor was Umstead who died only 1 year and 10 months after being sworn in [1953-54].

<u>U.S. Senators</u>: The average length of service for U.S. senators over the 20th century was 9.5 years. Furnifold Simmons-D [1901-31], who was the leader of the first of the two major 20th Century Democratic political machines in the state, served the longest at 30 years. He finally lost the battle to receive the Party's nomination in the 1930 Democratic Primary. Lee Overman-D served 27 years along side Simmons for most of those same years [1903-30] and died in office. Jesse Helms-R ties with Overman with 27 years of service and will soon rank in 2nd place in terms of service. Sam Ervin-D ranks 4th with 21 years of service [1954-75]. The shortest serving U.S. senator was James Broyhill-R, who was appointed to fill out the term of the late John East in early 1986. Broyhill was defeated for election in his own right later that same year by Terry Sanford-D [1987-1993].

Of interest here is the political fact of life that since Ervin retired in the mid-1970s, six separate individuals have held that revolving door seat — Robert Morgan-D [1975-1981], East-R, Broyhill-R, Sanford-D, Faircloth-R, and now Edwards-D. Every 6-year term has seen a partisan shift since the early 1970s while the other seat has remained in the Republican column over the same period.

What Is Next?

The 2000 election saw NC voters elect new Governor Mike Easley-D. No former city mayor has moved from that position directly into the governor's chair. William Umstead-D, a former mayor of Durham, was elected governor in 1952 but he had been appointed to the U.S. senate after being mayor and before running for governor. Only one attorney general had moved on to the governorship from that position, Thomas Bickett-D in 1916, until Easley's election. So neither of the major party candidates rode a trend of the past in seeking the governorship in this year's election.

The 2002 election may very well find us selecting Senator Helms successor. Will the usual suspects — former governors and current U.S. congressmen and women — be part of the mix, or will someone with little or no previous elective experience make a successful run. In 2004, we will see if Edwards is able to successfully challenge the revolving door nature of that seat. Tune in and see, there could be some surprises.

Ambition Ladders in the 20th Century

Gubernatorial Ambition Ladder					
Year	Rung	Governor, Party			
1900	none	Charles Aycock, D			
1904	SL	Robert Glenn, D			
1908	CN	William Kitchin, D			
1912	SL	Locke Craig, D			
1916	AG	Thomas Bickett, D			
1920	SL	Cameron Morrison, D			
1924	none	Angus McLean, D			
1928	LG	O. Max Gardner, D			
1932	SL	J.C.B. Ehringhaus, D			
1936	SL	Clyde Hoey, D			
1940	SL	J. Melville Broughton, D			
1944	SL	Gregg Cherry, D			
1948	AC	Kerr Scott, D			
1952	USS	William Umstead, D			
1954	LG	Luther Hodges, D			
1960	SL	Terry Sanford, D			
1964	SJ	Dan Moore, D			
1968	LG	Robert Scott. D			
1972	SL	Jim Holshouser, R			
1976	LG	Jim Hunt, D			
1984	CN	Jim Martin, R			
1992	FG	Jim Hunt, D			
2000	AG	Michael Easley, D			

Notes: Rung: the most recent elected office held by the new governor. They are: AC — agriculture commissioner; AG - attorney general; CN — congressman; FG — former governor; LG — lieutenant governor; SJ — superior court judge; SL — state legislature; USS — US senator

Sources: North Carolina Manual [various years]; Beth Crabtree, North Carolina Governors, 1585-1968 [Raleigh: State Department of Archives and History, 1968].

Last Elected Position Prior to E	Becomi	ng
Governor		
Position	#	%
State Legislature	9	39
Lieutenant governor	4	17
Attorney General	2	9
US Congress	2	9
Agriculture Commissioner	1	4
Former governor	1	4
US Senator	1	4
No previous elected position	3	13
Total	23	100

	Senatorial Ambition Ladder				
Year	Rung	US Senator, Party			
1900	CN	Furnifold Simmons, D			
1902	SL	Lee Overman, D			
1930	GV	Cameron Morrison, D			
1930	none	Josiah Bailey, D			
1932	none	Robert Reynolds, D			
1944	GV	Clyde Hoey, D			
1946	CN	William Umstead, D			
1948	GV	J. Melville Broughton, D			
1949	none	Frank Porter Graham, D			
1950	SL	Willis Smith, D			
1953	SL	Alton Lennon, D			
1954	SC	Sam Ervin, D			
1954	GV	Kerr Scott, D			
1958	none	B. Everett Jordan, D			
1973	CC	Jesse Helms, R			
1974	AG	Robert Morgan, D			
1980	none	John Porter East, R			
1986	CN	James Broyhill, R			
1986	GV	Terry Sanford, D			
1992	none	Lauch Faircloth, R			
1998	none	John Edwards, D			
	-	recent elected office held by the new US			
senator. T	senator. They are: AG — attorney general; CC —				

Notes: Rung: the most recent elected office held by the new US senator. They are: AG — attorney general; CC — City Council [Raleigh]; CN — congressman; GV — governor; SC — state Supreme Court Judge; SL — State Legislature.

Sources: North Carolina Manual [various years].

Last Elected Position Prior to Becoming					
Senator					
Position	#	%			
Governor	5	24			
State Legislator	3	14			
US Congress	3	14			
Attorney General	1	5			
City Council	1	5			
State Supreme Court	1	5			
No previous elected position	3	13			
Total	21	100			

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Presidential and Gubernatorial Voting Trends by Thad Beyle, Pearsall Chair in Political Science, UNC-CH

To explore North Carolina voting trends in the 20th century, the results of the 26 quadrennial presidential and gubernatorial elections between 1900 and 2000 are examined.

NC Presidential Voting in the 20th Century

The first comparisons are between how strong the Democratic or Republican voting was in the state compared to that strength in the nation as a whole.

<u>Democrats</u>: The N.C. Democratic presidential vote in the early to near-mid 20th century was always stronger than the Democratic vote nationwide. Remember, the 1900 election was the "inaugural" election of the first major Democratic political machine in the state last Century [+8.7 points], and this greater strength in North Carolina built quickly. This greater Democratic strength ranged reached a high of +24.8 points in 1924. The four Franklin Roosevelt races saw an average greater strength of over +13 points in the state than the nation. The one low point in that 44-year period was in 1928 when the Democratic presidential candidate was New York Governor Al Smith, a Catholic, a wet and a New Yorker [+ only 3.9 points].

With the passing of FDR from the political scene, the greater Democratic strength in the state versus the nation began to decline so that by the 1960 election Democratic candidate John Kennedy ran only 2 points stronger in North Carolina than nationally. From then on the strength of the Democratic vote in North Carolina lagged that in the nation, with the exceptions of Jimmy Carter's races of 1976 and 1980. Since the 1984 reelection of Ronald Reagan, the N.C. Democratic strength has gradually slipped further behind the party's strength in the nation to an average of -7 percentage points in the 1996 and 2000 elections.

Republicans: The N.C. Republican vote over the 20th century is the exact reverse of the Democratic experience. Trailing the national voting trends until after World War II, the Eisenhower elections of 1952 and 1956 began the trend of the Republican vote here in NC becoming more like that in the nation. Then beginning with the 1964 race with GOP candidate Barry Goldwater, the Republican vote here began to surpass that vote in the nation with three exceptions. One exception was in 1968 when Alabama Governor George Wallace cut into the vote of both party's candidates in the state, and the other two were Jimmy Carter elections of 1976 and 1980 already noted.

Importantly, since the 1984 presidential race, there has been a steady growth in the N.C. Republican vote versus the national party vote. In the two most recent elections — 1996 and 2000 — the Republican candidate ran an average of +7.5 percentage points stronger in North Carolina than in the nation.

(Continued on page 9)

Presidential Voting in North Carolina						
	Repub	<u>licans</u>	Democ	rats_		
Year &	NC [[+] or [-]	NC [+] or [-]		
Party ⁱ		JS Vote ⁱⁱ	Vote % U	JS Vote ⁱⁱⁱ		
1900-R	45.5	-6.2	54.2	8.7		
1904-R	39.7	-20.3	55.2	17.6		
1908-R	45.5	-9	54.4	11.4		
1912-D	12	-12.9 ^{iv}	59.2	17.4		
1916-D	41.7	-6.6	58.1	8.9		
1920-R	43.2	-17.1	56.8	20.6		
1924-R	40.3	-14.4	59.6	24.8		
1928-R	54.9	-3.3	45.1	3.9		
1932-D	29.5	-10.3	69.8	10.7		
1936-D	26.6	-9.9	73.4	10.9		
1940-D	26	-18.8	74	19		
1944-D	33.3	-12.6	66.7	12.9		
1948-D	36	-12.4	58	5.7		
1952-R	46.1	-9	53.9	8.3		
1956-R	49.3	-8.1	50.7	8.5		
1960-D	47.9	-1.6	52.1	2		
1964-D	43.9	5.3	56.2	-5.1		
1968-R	44.2	-3.9	42.5	-6.7		
1972-R	70.6	8.8	28.9	-9.3		
1976-D	44.4	-3.8	55.3	4.2		
1980-R	51.1	-1.4	47.2	2.5		
1984-R	62	3.1	37.9	-2.9		
1988-R	58	4.6	41.8	-4.6		
1992-D	50.5	6	49.5	-4		
1996-D	52.5	8.2	47.4	-7.3		
2000-R ^v	56.5	6.7	43.5	-6.7		

Sources: America at the Polls: 1996 [Storrs, CT: the Roper Center, Univ. of Connecticut, 1997]: 92-95; The State of 2 Parties [Raleigh: NC Center for Public Policy Research, 1987]: 13-14; Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics [Washington, DC: The National Journal, various years].

Election year and party winning the White House

iiThe percentage point margin by which the NC Republican share of the two-party vote for president

exceeded [+] or trailed [-] the Republican percentage nationally iii The percentage point margin by which the NC Democratic share of the two-party vote for president

exceeded [+] or trailed [-] the Democratic percentage nationally.

ivRepublican Party % of the 2-party vote as former Republican

President Teddy Roosevelt ran on the

Progressive or "Bull Moose" Party ticket winning 30% of the vote nationally and 28.4% of the NC vote.

^vIn 2000, the 2-party national popular vote was 50.2% Gore-D to 49.8% Bush-R.

Presidential vs. Gubernatorial Voting in the 20th Century Here the question is whether it is the presidential candidate's coattails pulling along the party's gubernatorial candidate or vice-versa.

<u>Democrats</u>: Throughout the 20th century, it was the Democratic gubernatorial candidate running stronger than the Democratic presidential candidate. The one exception was in 1936 when Franklin Roosevelt ran for his first re-election and received nearly three-quarters of the state vote. Democratic gubernatorial candidate Clyde Hoey got two-thirds of the vote that in most political circles would be considered a landslide victory. At the other extreme was the 1972 election when Democratic gubernatorial candidate Hargrove "Skipper" Bowles ran nearly +20 points stronger than George McGovern, the Democratic presidential candidate. No matter, they still both lost their bids.

In six of the eight last quadrennial elections, it has been more of a question whether Jim Hunt has run stronger than the Democratic presidential candidate in the state. These races include his successful bids for lieutenant governor in 1972, for governor in 1976, 1980, 1992, 1996, and his unsuccessful bid for a US Senate seat in 1984. He has run about an average of +10 points better than the Democratic presidential candidate in each of his elections. This ranged from a high of +15 points greater in his 1980 first re-election bid to a low of +5.4 points greater in his successful 1992 come-back bid for a third term.

In the 2000 elections, Democratic gubernatorial candidate Michael Easley continued this century-long trend of the Democratic governor's vote being greater than the vote for Democratic presidential candidate Al Gore. Easley ran +9.4 percentage points stronger than did Gore — showing the same strength as Hunt has in his elections in the past three decades.

Republicans: Again, the Republican picture in comparing the results of these elections is almost the reverse of the Democrats. In 22 of the 26 quadrennial elections over the 20th Century, it was the Republican presidential candidate running stronger than the Republican gubernatorial candidate. This was especially true in the two Eisenhower elections of 1952 and 1956, and the first Reagan election of 1980. It was also true in the 1972 election when the George Wallace candidacy skewed voting in the state. But, that year Republicans won both the presidential and gubernatorial elections with President Nixon being re-elected to a second term and Jim Holshouser becoming the first Republican governor of the 20th century.

In the four Jim Hunt gubernatorial elections, the Republican candidate ran 9 percentage points behind the Republican presidential candidate. And in the 2000 gubernatorial election, Republican gubernatorial candidate Richard Vinroot ran -9.4 percentage points behind Republican presidential

Presidential vs. Gubernatorial Voting ¹					
Year & Party ⁱ	Repub NC Pres. 0 Vote % ²			crats Gov. /ote %	
1900	42.7-W	40.4	-2.3	54.2	
1904	44.8-W	38.2	-6.6	55.2	
1908	45.6-W	42.6	-3	54.4	
1912	12.0-L	17.9	5.9	59.2	
1916	41.8-L	41.7	-0.1	58.1	
1920	43.2-W	42.8	-0.4	56.8	
1924	40.3-W	38.7	-1.6	59.6	
1928	54.9-L	44.4	-10.5	45.1	
1932	29.2-L	30	0.8	69.8	
1936	26.6-L	33.3	6.7	73.4	
1940	26.0-L	24.3	-1.7	74	
1944	33.3-L	30.4	-2.9	66.7	
1948	32.7-L	26.5	-6.2	58	
1952	46.1-W	32.5	-13.6	53.9	
1956	49.3-W	33	-16.3	50.7	
1960	47.9-L	45.5	-2.4	52.1	
1964	43.9-L	43.4	-0.5	56.2	
1968	39.5-W	47.3	7.8	42.5	
1972	69.5-W	51.3	-18.2	28.9	
1976	44.2-L	34.3	-9.9	55.3	
1980	49.3-W	37.7	-11.6	47.2	
1984	61.3-W	54.4	-6.9	37.9	
1988	58.0-W	56.1	-1.9	41.8	
1992	50.5-L	45.1	-5.4	49.5	
1996	52.5-L	43.3	-9.2	47.4	
2000	56.5-	47.1	-9.4	43.5	

Sources: America at the Polls: 1996 [Storrs, CT: the Roper Center, Univ. of Connecticut, 1997]: 92-95; The State of 2 Parties [Raleigh: NC Center for Public Policy Research, 1987]: 13-14; Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, The Almanac of American Politics [Washington, DC: The National Journal, various years].

¹Democratic and Republican Parties % of the 2-party vote. ²Republican % of 2-party vote and winner of national election except in 1912 when former Republican President Teddy Roosevelt ran on the Progressive of "Bull Moose" Party ticket winning 28.4% of the NC vote.

³Republican Party % of the 2-party vote except in 1912 when the Progressive Party gubernatorial candidate won 20.4% of the statewide vote

candidate George W. Bush. This continued the century-long trend of the vote for Republican presidential candidates being greater than the vote for Republican gubernatorial candidates.

Will These Trends Continue?

Will what we have seen over the past century continue or are we in the process of changing? One factor is clear: Jim Hunt will not (Continued on page 15)

Page 10 North Carolina DataNet

Regional Representation in Statewide Offices by Thad Beyle, Pearsall Chair in Political Science, UNC-CH

Part of the political folklore of the state concerns how two Democratic political machines that "ran" the state between 1900 and 1948 made certain there was an east-west regional rotation in who held the governor's chair. But the 1948 election of Democratic Commissioner of Agriculture Kerr Scott as governor changed this strategic approach. Not only did Scott defeat the incumbent administration's machine's choice, state Treasurer Charles Johnson, but he came from Alamance County, a county in the middle of the state that could be defined as either in the east or the west, depending on your perspective. And he was the first non-lawyer elected governor in 50 years.

Since then the regional spread of who holds the governor's chair has changed. In the 14 gubernatorial elections held between 1948 to 2000, seven of the winners were from the east, five from the west, and 2 from the middle county, Alamance. Four of the east winners were one person, Jim Hunt, while two of the west winners were also one person, Jim Martin. The two winners from Alamance County were from the same family – the father Kerr Scott and his son Bob Scott. The 2000 gubernatorial election saw the two major party candidates in a mini "east-west confrontation" — Democrat Mike Easley [east] and Republican Richard Vinroot [west] in which the east candidate won once again.

Does adding in who holds the two U.S. Senate seats over the same period change this regional representation pattern? Rather than measure the regional distribution election year by election year for these offices, it will be measured by who held each of these three seats at two-year intervals between 1947-2001. This provides 28 separate odd-year readings for each of these three statewide offices for 84 separate data points.

In reviewing the regional representation over this 54-year period, it is clear that the east has been better represented by who holds these offices [54% of the data points] than has the west [31% of the data points]. This is a 1.7 to 1 east to west ratio. So, the political folklore of the pre-World War II past just doesn't hold even when the two U.S. Senate seats are added in.

However, it is apparent that there are two distinct time periods involved over this 54-year post-World War II stretch. The first period runs from 1947 through 1971 when the east was not well represented in who held these three offices [18%]. Nearly half of the individuals holding these seats were from the west [49%] and another one-third were individuals from Alamance County – the Scotts, and B. Everett Jordan who held the current Helms' seat. The second period runs from 1973 to date when individuals from the east have dominated these seats [84%] they include U.S. Senators Jesse Helms, John East, Terry Sanford, Lauch Faircloth and John Edwards and Governor Hunt. The west's only office holders were U.S. Senators Sam Ervin and Jim Broyhill and Governors Jim Holshouser and Martin.

Post-World V		ional Rep tewide Of	
Year	Gov.	Helms	Edwards
		Seat	Seat
1947	West	East*	West
1949	Mid	East*	West
1951	Mid	East*	West
1953	East	East*	West
1955	West	Mid	West
1957	West	Mid	West
1959	West	Mid	West
1961	East	Mid	West
1963	East	Mid	West
1965	West	Mid	West
1967	West	Mid	West
1969	Mid	Mid	West
1971	Mid	Mid	West
1973	West	East*	West
1975	West	East*	East
1977	East	East*	East
1979	East	East*	East
1981	East	East*	East
1983	East	East*	East
1985	West*	East*	East
1987	West*	East*	East*
1989	West*	East*	East*
1991	West*	East*	East*
1993	East	East*	East
1995	East	East*	East
1997	East	East*	East
1999	East	East*	East*
2001	East*	East*	East*

While this analysis is tied to earlier 20th Century political patterns, it might be more to the point now to look at the major metropolitan, non-major metropolitan county pattern in terms of where these office holders came from. Over the whole 54-year period, those from the non-metropolitan counties outnumbered those from the larger metropolitan counties by about a 1.8 to 1 ratio [64% to 36%]. But again the break at the 1972 election is quite important. Between 1947 and 1971, those from the nonmetropolitan counties outnumbered their more metropolitan colleagues by a 6.8 to 1 ratio [87% to 13%]. Since then the ratio has shifted more in favor of those from the metropolitan counties [55% to 45%].

Two caveats to this last shift. First, a good part of the change is tied to the election of Wake County resident Jesse Helms to the

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U.S. Senate [15 of the 24 metropolitan county data points]. Second, despite Jim Hunt's long-time stay in the Raleigh Governor's mansion, he was still counted as a Wilson County, non-metropolitan resident. But, note that after the 1998 and 2000 elections, all three individuals holding these major offices live in the capital city, within a 3-mile radius of each other.

Post-World War II Regional Representation in Major Statewide Elective Offices, Summary						
Region		7 to			Tot	als
	#	%	#	%	#	%
East	7	18	38	84	45	54
West	19	49	7	16	26	31
Mid	13	33	-	-	13	15
Totals	39	100	45	100	84	100
Metro	5	13	25	56	30	36
Non/M	34	87	20	44	54	64
Totals	39	100	45	100	84	100

Grow	th of NC Reg	gistered Voter	s, 1968-2000
Year	Total NC	% Growth	% Growth
	Registered	Over Last	Over 1968
	Voters	Election	Election
1968	2,077,538	N/A	N/A
1972	2,357,645	+13.8	+ 13.8
1976	2,553,717	+ 8.3	+ 22.9
1980	2,774,844	+ 8.7	+ 33.6
1984	3,270,933	+17.9	+ 57.4
1988	3,432,042	+ 4.9	+ 65.2
1992	3,817,380	+11.2	+ 83.7
1996	4,330,657	+13.4	+108.5
2000	5,122,123	+18.3	+146.5

Year	# of Voters	% Growth Over Last Election	% Growth Over 1960 Election
1960	1,368,556	N/A	N/A
1964	1,424,983	+ 4.1	+ 4.1
1968	1,587,493	+11.4	+ 16.0
1972	1,518,612	- 4.3	+ 11.0
1976	1,677,906	+10.5	+ 22.6
1980	1,855,833	+10.6	+ 35.6
1984	2,239,051	+20.6	+ 63.6
1988	2,180,025	- 2.6	+ 59.3
1992	2,611,850	+19.8	+ 90.8
1996	2,618,326	+ 0.2	+ 91.3
2000	3,015,964	+15.2	+120.4

NC Voter Registration and Turnout in Presidential Election Years, 1960 to 2000

Year	Total NC	Total NC		NC Turnou	ıt	Par	rty of Wi	nner
	Voting-Age	Registered	# of	% of Reg.	% of Voting	-		
	Population	Voters	Voters	Voters	Age Pop.	Pres.	Sen.	Gov.
1960	2,585,000	N/A	1,368,556		52.9	D	D	D
1964	2,723,000	N/A	1,424,983		52.3	D		D
1968	2,921,000	2,077,538	1,587,493	76.4	54.4	D	D	D
1972	3,541,399	2,357,645	1,518,612	64.4	42.9	R	R	R
1976	3,884,477	2,553,717	1,677,906	65.7	43.2	D		D
1980	4,222,654	2,774,844	1,855,833	66.9	43.9	R	R	D
1984	4,585,788	3,270,933	2,239,051	68.5	47.4	R	R	R
1988	4,887,358	3,432,042	2,180,025	63.5	44.6	R		R
1992	5,182,321	3,817,380	2,611,850	68.4	50.4	R	R	D
1996	5,499,000	4,330,657	2,618,326	60.5	47.6	R	R	D
2000		5,122,123	3,015,964	58.9		R		D
Source	: North Carolina	DataNet #25 [Ju	ne 2000]: 3, N	IC State Bo	ard of Electio	ns		

Page 12 North Carolina

DataNet

State and National Comparison, cont. by Guillory

(Continued from page 5)

daily political journalism of the campaign.

Talk radio remains part of the political fabric – more so on the national than the state level, but still a factor in some North Carolina communities. For conservatives in particular, talk radio serves as an outlet for expression and for motivation.

In campaigns, radio serves another function – the targeting of messages to selected audiences. For campaigns, radio time is far less expensive than TV time. And, because radio is so fragmented and because most stations cater to a certain demographic group rather than to a general audience, campaigns buy commercial time on stations as a way of directing messages – whether a get-out-the-vote motivation or an attack on an opponent — to a segment of voters.

Newspapers

Press coverage still bears the imprint of what is known as civic

journalism. That is, the state's major newspapers work from the guiding concept that their coverage should be more votercentered than candidate-centered, that they should be less tied to the candidates' agendas and to the "horse race," and more devoted to helping citizens make up their minds on how to vote.

News organizations formed the Your Voice, Your Vote consortium, as they had in 1996. It included seven newspapers, as well as six commercial TV stations and WUNC public radio, which conducted joint polls on voters' opinions and joint interviews with the candidates. In addition, major newspapers continued with the regime of "ad watches," in which candidates' TV commercials – though not typically radio commercials – are examined for tone and factual accuracy.

Newspapers, of course, provide coverage beyond the YVYV packages and the ad watches. Still, newspaper coverage is driven far less by day-to-day campaign dynamics, more by the newspapers' own decisions and agendas. Still, there was considerable

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Voter Falloff Down the Ballot, 1984-2000 by Thad Beyle, Pearsall Chair in Political Science, UNC-CH

One of the political realities on Election Day is that voters don't always vote in each of the races on the ballot or on all of the issues. In effect, there is a falloff in the levels of voting as voters move down the ballot in casting their votes. Looking at the total votes cast in the statewide contests over the past five presidential and gubernatorial year elections demonstrates this.

For the 1984 elections, the voter turnout figure used was the total number voting in the Jesse Helms-Jim Hunt U.S. Senate race; for the 1988 elections, the voter turnout figure used was the total number voting in the Jim Martin-Robert Jordan governor's race; and for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 elections the actual voter turnout figures were provided by the State Board of Elections. All election data is from the N.C. Board of Elections.

It should come as no surprise that the top three offices in garnering the most votes in each of the five elections were the presidential, gubernatorial and U.S. senatorial races. When there was no U.S. senatorial race, the lieutenant governor's race became one of the top three [1988, 2000]. The four executive branch offices attracting the lowest number of votes in these elections generally were the state auditor, labor commissioner, superintendent of public instruction, and state treasurer races. Between these two groups were the races for agriculture commissioner, attorney general, insurance commissioner, and secretary of state. There were also some "blips" in attracting voters when there was an open seat and/or a very contested race such as in the 1996 secretary of state race between Democrat Elaine-Marshall and Republican Richard Petty.

Judicial races tend to attract fewer voters too. In 1996, the three judicial races for seats on the state's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals saw an average voter falloff of 9.4 percentage point [an average 250,000 voter falloff]. In 2000, the highly contested Chief Justice race between Democratic incumbent Chief Justice Henry Frye and Republican Associate Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr. was among the top four races with only 6.2 percentage point falloff — an 187,000-voter falloff. The other six statewide judicial races saw an average 9.7 percentage point falloff.

Once the question facing the voter moves from "for whom do you vote" to "do you approve or disapprove a bond issue or a constitutional amendment," voter falloff increases even more. For example, at the very lowest level in both the 1996 and 2000 elections were bond issues. In 1996, fewer voters cast a vote on the school bond issue [a 370,000 voter falloff] and the road bond issue [a 413,000 voter falloff]. In 2000, there was a nearly 440,000-voter falloff in the number of votes cast on the \$3.1 billion Higher Education Bond issue.

Constitutional amendment referenda fare even worse. In 1984, the constitutional amendment requiring that the state's attorney general and district attorneys must "be duly authorized to practice law prior to election or appointment" attracted only 68% of the voters who had voted in the Helms-Hunt U.S. senate race — a 32-percentage point voter falloff. In 1996, the three constitutional amendments on granting the governor veto power, providing for alternative punishments, and victims' rights only attracted an average of 2.2 million votes, a falloff of the 2.6 million vot-

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Voter Falloff Down the Ballot, cont. by Beyle

(Continued from page 12)

ers — a 16.1 percentage point falloff.

Is this something to worry about? Probably not, but there is always the potential for such voter falloff down the ballot to make a difference. It does mean there are slightly different electorates making the decision over the bond issues and who the judges will be than who will be the next president or governor. If there were a bias in just who those non-voters in particular contests were and a concerted effort by one group or another to affect the outcome of a very close contest, the voting results could be affected.

Voter Falloff Down the Ballot, 1984-2000

1984	
Voter Turnout: 2,2	39,051
[Based on US Senate Ra	ce totals]
Race:	% voting
US Senate	100.0
Governor	99.4
President	97.2
Lieutenant Governor	95.6
Secretary of State	92.8
Agric. Commissioner	91.4
Insurance Commissioner	91.0
Attorney General	90.9
Sup. Of Public Instruction	n 90.8
Labor Commissioner	90.4
Auditor	90.1
CA: AG & DA as lawye	rs 67.8
Treasurer	55.2*
CA = Constitutional ame * = unopposed	endment

Voter Turnout: 2,180,02					
[Based on Governor's ra	ace totalj				
Race:	% voting				
Governor	100.0				
President	97.9				
Lieutenant Governor	97.1				
Secretary of State	95.7				
Attorney General	93.3				
Insurance Commission	er 92.5				
Agric. Commissioner	92.3				
Treasurer	91.5				
Auditor	91.5				
Labor Commissioner	91.2				
Sup. Of Public Instruction	ion 91.1				

1988

1992	
Voter Turnout: 2,	,611,850
Race:	% voting
President	99.99
Governor	99.4
US Senator	98.7
Lieutenant Governor	96.0
Secretary of State	95.6
Attorney General	93.1
Insurance Commissione	, , , ,
Agric. Commissioner	92.7
Treasurer	92.1
Labor Commissioner	90.7
Auditor	90.7
Sup. of Public Instruction	

1996

Voter Turnout: 2	2,618,326
Race:	% voting
Governor	98.0
US Senator	97.6
President	96.1
Secretary of State	95.3
Attorney General	94.0
Lieutenant Governor	93.9
Insurance Commission	ner 93.5
Agric. Commissioner	93.2
Treasurer	92.0
Sup. of Public Instruct	ion 91.3
Chief Justice, Supreme	e Ct. 90.9
Labor Commissioner	90.8
Assoc. Justice, Sup. Ct	t. 90.7
Auditor	90.6
Appeals Ct. Justice	89.7
School Bonds Issue	85.9
Road Bonds Issue	84.2
CA: Victim's Rights	84.2

2000						
Voter Turnout:	3,015,964					
Race:	% voting					
Governor	97.5					
President	96.7					
Lieutenant Governor	95.0					
Chief Justice, Sup. Ct.	93.8					
Attorney General	93.7					
Insurance Commissioner	93.3					
Agric. Commissioner	93.0					
Treasurer	92.2					
Secretary of State	92.1					
Assoc. Justice, Sup. Ct.	91.7					
Sup. of Public Instruction	n 91.7					
Auditor	91.4					
Labor Commissioner	91.2					
Appeals Ct. [Horton]	90.4					
Appeals Ct. [John]	90.3					
Appeals Ct. [Martin]	90.1					
Appeals Ct. [Lewis]	90.0					
Appeals Ct. [Wynn]	89.5					
Higher Education Bonds	85.5					

D					N RESULTS	5 100 100	
Race	Candidate, Party	Votes	%	# Regist Number Turnout		5,122,123 3,015,964 58.9	
Pres.:	Gore/Lieberman, D	1,257,692	43.1	1 01110 010	,,	20.5	
	Bush/Cheney, R	1,631,163	56.1				
	Browne/Foster, Lib	13,891			sional Races:		
	Buchanan, Ref	8,874		1 st CD	•	124,171	
	McReynolds,	3,370			Kratzer, R Delaney, Lib	62,198 2,799	
Gov.:	Easley, D	1,530,324		and are	F1 11 F1	1.1.5 = 2.2	70.0
	Vinroot, R	1,360,960		2 nd CD	Etheridge, D*	146,733	
	Howe, Lib.	42,674			Haynes, R	103,011	
	Schell, Ref.	8,104	.3		Jackson, Lib	2,094	.8
Lt. Gov	Perdue, D	1,500,206		3^{rd} CD	McNary, D	74,058	
	Cochran, R	1,315,825			Jones. R*	121,940	
	Carter, Ref	50,352	1.8		Russell, Lib	2,457	1.2
Agric:	Phipps, D	1,418,164	50.6	4 th CD:	Price, D*	200,885	61.6
	Troxler, R	1,386,311	49.4		Ward, R	119,412	36.6
					Towey, Lib	5,573	1.7
AtyGen	Cooper, D	1,446,793		eth an	D D#	172 100	02.0
	Boyce, R	1,310,845		5 th CD	Burr, R*	172,489	
	Palms, Ref	67,536	2.4		LeBoeuf, Lib	13,366	1.2
Auditor	Campbell, D	1,392,211	50.5	6 th CD:	Coble, R*	195,727	91.0
	Merritt, R	1,363,890	49.5		Bentley, Lib Gay, WI	18,726 632	8.7
Ins.Cm:	Long, D	1,590,139					
	Causey, R	1,222,527	43.5	7 th CD:	McIntyre, D*	160,185	
:	D D	1 272 1 65	40.0		Adams, R	66,463	
Lab.Cm	:Berger, D Berry, R	1,372,165 1,379,417			Burns, Lib	3,018	1.3
	Delly, K	1,379,417	30.1	8 th CD	Taylor, D	89,505	44 0
SofSt.:	Marshall, D*	1,512,076	54.4	o CD	Hayes, R*	111,950	
	Blake, R	1,265,654			Schwartz, Lib	2,009	1.0
SofPIn.:	Ward, D*	1,475,309	53.4	9 th CD:	McGuire, D	79,382	30.0
	Barrick, R	1,289,472			Myrick, R*	181,161	
					Cole, Lib	2,459	.9
Treas	Moore, D	1,539,761			Cahaney, Ref	1,218	.5
	McKoy, R	1,242,202	44.7	10 th CD	Parker, D*	70,877	20.5
State Le	gislature			10 CD	Ballenger, R*	164,182	
House	D Seats	62	51.7		Eddins, Lib	5,599	
House	R Seats		48.3			-,	
				11 th CD	Neill, D	112,234	
Senate	D Seats		70.0		Taylor, R*	146,677	
	R Seats	15	30.0		Williams, Lib	7,466	2.8
Higher l	Education Bond Issue			12 th CD	Watt, D*	135,570	64.8
	Pro Pro	1,898,592		02	Mitchell, R	69,596	

(Continued from page 14)						
Con		678,731	26.3			
Lyon, L	ib 3,9	78 1.9				
2000 N.C. GE	ENERAL ELEC	TION RES	HITS			
Supreme Court F		HONTES	OLIO			
		1 275 020	10.6			
Chief Justice, SC	•	1,375,820				
	Lake, R	1,453,039	51.4			
Assoc.Justice. SO	CFreeman, D	1,328,623	48.0			
	Edmunds, R	1,436,510	52.0			
Court of Appeals	Races					
Horton Seat		1,354,543	49 7			
Horton Scat	McCullogh, R					
	Wiccumogn, K	1,3/1,/90	30.3			
Inlan Cant	E-11 D	1 260 200	40.0			
John Seat	Fuller, D	1,360,309				
	Tyson, R	1,364,239	50.1			
Lewis Seat	Hudson, D	1,396,957	51.5			
	Stam, R	1,317,677	48.5			
Martin Seat	Martin, D*	1,375,920	50.6			
111111111111111111111111111111111111111	Enochs, R	1,341,854				
	Eliociis, it	1,5-1,05-	17.4			
Wronn Coat	Wron D*	1 200 160	51.5			
Wynn Seat	Wynn, D*	1,390,169	31.3			

Voting Trends, cont. by Beyle

(Continued from page 9)

be a part of this electoral calculus. Still, it seems quite probable that the two parties will continue to see stronger runs by one of the two candidates. For the Democrats it will be the gubernatorial candidate. For the Republicans it will be the presidential candidate. Why do you think that 2000 Vinroot campaign ads stressed a Bush-Vinroot team and there were complaints that Easley consistently ducked being paired with Al Gore? We will have to wait until 2004 to see if these seemingly ageless patterns continue.

Plural Media, cont. by Guillory

(Continued from page 12)

commentary about the decisions of both Democratic Gov. Mike Easley and his Republican opponent, Richard Vinroot, to minimize daily campaigning and to devote much more time to raising money to pay for TV commercials.

A kind of circular dynamic seemed to have taken hold. Journalists acknowledge that they are much less likely than in the past to show up for candidates' press conferences and to report on stump speeches. Candidates and their strategists, in turn, ask themselves why spend time giving civic club luncheon speeches that reach only a few, mostly committed, voters when there will be no media coverage and when they can reach many more voters through TV ads.

At least two results grow out of this media-political landscape. One is that the governor's race had few "markers," but they emerged as more crucial because they represented moments at which candidates had to speak at length – to the examination of voters and each other. Those markers included the YVYV candidate-interviews and the two TV debates. The second is that, in the absence of day-to-day campaigning and coverage as in the presidential election, TV commercials have become even more dominant in North Carolina's gubernatorial and senatorial elections.

A footnote: The Charlotte Observer went a significant step beyond other newspapers in offering Easley and Vinroot space to expound their views at length. In a newspaper equivalent of WRAL-TV's candidates' messages, the Observer invited the Democratic and Republican nominees to write several hundred words on key issues, and the newspapers ran side-by-side articles on five days, including three on big-circulation Sundays.

Editor's Note

With this issue of NC DataNet, we introduce Ryan Thornburg as the assistant director of the Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life.

Ryan's responsibilities will include coordinating the publication of DataNet. His joining the program will allow us to publish on a more regular schedule, as well as to expand the circulation. Please let him know if you, or a friend, would like to be added to our mailing list at thornburg@unc. edu.

Since graduating from the University of North Carolina in 1997, Ryan served as a writer and editor at washingtonpost.com. In addition to coordinating DataNet, he will develop a Web site of information on political trends and issues in the South.

We also acknowledge the invaluable work of administrative aide Nancy Edward and graduate assistant Nadia Watts in producing this issue.

Thad Beyle Ferrel Guillory Program on Southern Politics, Media and Public Life School of Journalism and Mass Communication University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

CB #3365 University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3365

Phone: (919) 962-5936 Email: SouthNow@unc.edu

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